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Illinois’ outstate police
and firefighters’ pensions
are generous when
compared to the pension
systems offered by other
states.
Illinois’ police and
firefighter pension funds
are in unsound financial
condition – in even
worse financial condition
than the funds serving
Illinois teachers and
state employees.
Recent benefit
enhancements approved
by the General Assembly
have imperiled the
pension funds’ financial
condition despite
substantial increases in
municipal contributions
to them.
It is the job of the
General Assembly to
protect the integrity of
the pension funds.
The General Assembly
must avoid further
benefit enhancements
until the funds are
returned to sound
financial condition.
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issue: Illinois Police Officers And Fire Fighters:
How Good Are Their Pensions?
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NIU Center for Governmental Studies
No group of state or local government employees is more deserving of a sound pension
system than Illinois’ finest: its police officers and firefighters. They willingly face danger – sometimes extreme danger and death – so that Illinois residents and visitors can
live in a safer, more secure world. If the need arose, there is every reason to believe that
Illinois police and fire personnel would react with the same bravery, determination, and
self-sacrifice as did New York City fire and police on September 11, 2001.
Unfortunately, however, the pension systems for all Illinois municipal police and firefighters,
even including Chicago, are not financially sound. Even more worrisome, their pensions
are becoming less secure with each passing year. Illinois police officers and firefighters,
especially the younger ones, ought to be worried about the fiscal health of their pension
funds. As the nation learned when New York City went bankrupt in the 1970’s, employee
pension funds are not exempt from the negative changes that accompany municipal
bankruptcy.
Why is there concern about police and
fire pensions?
Most Illinois’ pension funds for public
employees are in financial trouble. The
plight of the state’s retirement programs for
public school teachers and state workers
has been widely discussed in the media,
but the pension funds serving police officers and firefighters are in even worse
financial condition.
This conclusion is based upon data compiled in a recent, professionally sound
analysis of police and fire pension funds for
all Illinois municipalities other than Chicago (herein called “outstate”)1 prepared
by the Illinois Municipal League with the

cooperation of the Illinois City/County
Management Association.2 Because sound
and economically attractive police and
fire pensions are critically important to
the safety of the citizens of Illinois, this
issue of Policy Profiles is devoted to an
examination of the question:
What needs to be done to improve the
financial strength of the pension systems for Illinois police officers and
firefighters, with special emphasis
on those public safety personnel in
all Illinois municipalities other than
Chicago?3
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Do Illinois police and fire fighters have
good pension systems?
Illinois’ outstate police and fire pension
systems are generous when compared
to the systems offered in other states.
According to the IML report, outstate
Illinois police and fire pension systems
provide benefits that rank: (1) seventh
when compared to 50 other state defined
benefit pension programs; (2) third when
compared to the pension programs in the
16 Midwestern states; and (3) second only
to Iowa when compared with the pension
programs of the states sharing a common
border with Illinois. Illinois also has the
only public pension system in the nation
which calculates individual police and fire
pensions based either on an annualization
of the amount of the last paycheck the individual receives or the individual’s highest
annual pay, whichever is greater.
On average, Illinois outstate police and
firefighter pensioners receive approximately $533 more per month than the average
of public safety personnel in the other 50
state defined benefit pension programs;
$352 more per month than the average of
their peers in the 16 Midwestern states;
and $276 more per month than the average of their peers in the states bordering
on Illinois.
Then why should police and firefighters
in Illinois be concerned?
It is a well-known and acknowledged matter of public record that Illinois’ public
employee retirement systems are in a state
of crisis, with over $35 billion in unfunded
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Comparison of Unfunded Debt in Pension Funds

The non-Chicago municipal police and fire pension funds are carrying more debt (in the
form of unfunded liability) per active employee than the widely reported debt within the
Teachers Retirement System (TRS) and State Employees Retirement System (SERS).
Source: Illinois Municipal League

obligations in pension funds for state
employees and an additional $15 billion
in unfunded obligations in pension funds
serving local government employees.
Most public attention so far has been
focused on the Illinois Teachers’ Retirement System and the State Employees’
Retirement System. Together, these two
funds have over $28 billion in unfunded
obligations.
However, when unfunded pension obligations are analyzed on a per covered
employee basis, Illinois’ police and fire
pension funds, including both Chicago and
outstate funds, are in even worse financial
condition. Unfunded obligations for Chicago police and fire personnel amount to

approximately $300,000 per employee
and outstate police and fire amount to approximately $190,000 per employee. These
unfunded shortfalls are over 270 percent
more per employee in Chicago and 170
percent more per employee outstate than
the per employee shortfalls in the funds
serving the state’s teachers and other state
employees.
Chart 1 compares the aggregate debt,
calculated on a per employee basis, for
outstate police and firefighters with the
same debt for Illinois teachers and state
employees. Clearly, the pension fund crisis
poses much more critical long term risks
for police and fire fighters.
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Downstate Police Unfunded Liability, 1987-2004
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While the state’s pension crisis poses no
immediate threat to the pension of retired
employees, it could pose a threat to the
pensions of current workers if benefit
changes are forced upon them due to the
funds’ worsening financial health.
Will the funds’ financial condition
improve in the years ahead?

Source: Illinois Municipal League

chartthree Downstate Fire Unfunded Liability (1987-2004)

Source: Illinois Municipal League

The state’s public employee pension funds’
financial condition has been getting worse,
even despite the strong economy of recent
years. Indeed, the condition of the outstate
police and fire funds has gotten much
worse; there has been a virtual explosion
in the funds’ unfunded liabilities in the last
five years. Such growth means that the crisis is getting much worse very quickly. This
growth is portrayed in Charts 2 and 3.
Worst of all, the amount of pension liability
that can be covered by monies currently
deposited in the pension fund – called the
“funded ratio” in accounting terms – has
been dropping rapidly in the outstate police and fire funds. In the seventeen years
between 1987 and 2004, the funded ratio
in the outstate police pension funds has
dropped from 72.7% in 1987 to 62.4%
in 2004. The funded ratio for outstate
fire pensions has similarly declined, from
73.33% in 1987 to 65.9% in 2004. These
changes are depicted in Charts 4 and 5 (on
the next page). Parenthetically, it should
be noted that a standard actuarial rule of
thumb holds that a funded ratio of 90%
is a strong indicator of a well-funded pension plan.

4
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Downstate Police Funded Ratio (1987-2004)

Source: Illinois Municipal League

chartfive

Downstate Fire Funded Ratio (1987-2004)

Source: Illinois Municipal League

Unless reversed, these trends in the outstate police and fire pension funds mean
severe long term problems in meeting the
needs of the families of those police and fire
personnel who have retired or who have
been injured in the line of duty.

Can the problem be solved by increasing the contribution cities and villages
make each year to police and fire
pension funds?
Most cities and villages are already
contributing more – a lot more – to fund
police and fire pensions, and still the financial condition of the funds continues
to worsen.
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In a targeted analysis of 59 police and fire
pension funds in 33 outstate urban area
Illinois municipalities,4 the IML study
found that the rate of suggested increase
in municipal tax levies,5 calculated as a
percentage of police and fire payrolls, has
gone up by approximately 47% between
2000 and 2004 for the police pension
funds and by approximately 38% for the
fire pension funds. These data are shown
in Chart 6 (on the next page). For comparison purposes, Chart 6 also shows that
municipal tax levies for the pensions of
other municipal employees, also calculated
as a percentage of payrolls, are still less
than they were in 1988.
On a per person basis, during this same
2000-2004 time period, the rate of contribution, calculated as a percentage of
payroll, made by outstate cities and villages to police pension funds increased by
approximately 8.5% and to fire funds by
approximately 9% while employee contributions to their pension funds in both cases
increased by approximately 1%. This data
is shown in Charts 7 (on the next page) and
8 (on page 6).
		
This, in turn, means that police and fire
pension fund obligations are already consuming a large and growing percentage
of municipal tax revenues: the City of
Chicago’s property taxes are now devoted
almost entirely to pension fund payments.
In its August 21, 2007, edition, the Chicago
Sun Times quoted a Chicago city official
as saying,
None of the city’s $713.4 million
property tax levy is available for
day-to-day operations. It’s largely
eaten up by pension obligations.
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Tax Levy as a Percentage of Payroll

Source: Illinois Municipal League

chartseven Downstate Police Funded Ratio (1987-2004)

Source: Illinois Municipal League
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Two other considerations make the situation even more tenuous. First, despite
the increases in tax dollar contributions
to pension funds, the unfunded liabilities
continue to grow every time the Illinois
General Assembly increases the level of
pension benefits to be paid out. In the
last seven years, there have been three
new pension enhancements imposed on
these funds: enhancements were added
in 2000 (fire), 2001 (police), and 2005
(fire). The 2005 fire pension enhancement
increased the City of Champaign’s fire
pension fund unfunded liability by $6
million and dropped its funding percentage by 12 percent, forcing still larger tax
contributions.6
Second, for outstate municipalities subject
to tax caps, the rate of municipal pension
fund contributions, as described in Charts
7 and 8, is increasing faster than the tax
cap limitations allow their tax levies to
increase. As a result, many municipalities,
and especially non-home rule cities and
villages which rely on property taxes for
the bulk of their tax revenues, have had
to face a Hobbesian choice. They either
have to:
1. Use actuarial assumptions that would
enable them to meet their statutory
obligations to finance pensions and still
keep their rates of property tax increases
within statutory tax cap limitations, but
not enough more to keep their funds
properly financed, or

6
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2. Begin to utilize revenue sources
traditionally committed to other municipal services to make up for the shortfall
between the yearly contribution to the
pension funds and the amount of funds
that can be levied within the restrictions
of the property tax cap, or

Northern Illinois University

charteight Downstate Fire Employer and Employee Contributions
as Percentage of Payroll

3. Cut back on police and fire services as
well as on other services in order to fund
police and fire pensions.
Much too frequently, from a public safety
perspective, they cut back on police and
fire services by limiting or reducing the
number of police and fire personnel serving the community.
Source: Illinois Municipal League

What all of this means is simply this: even
municipalities that are making Herculean
efforts to fund adequately their police and
fire pensions are falling further behind. Primary blame for the deteriorating condition
of the outstate police and fire pension funds
can not legitimately be placed on local
elected officials (who must also deal with
the anger of local citizens when property
taxes are raised).
		
Are individual municipalities really being hurt by the pension fund problem?
Yes, most if not all outstate Illinois municipalities are already being hurt by the
problems confronting their police and
fire pension programs, but, as might be
expected, not all are being affected in the
same way. Some are experiencing greater

tax levy stress than others; some are being
forced to make large increases in their rate
of tax levy as a percent of payroll; and others are limiting or reducing the number of
police and fire officers on the payroll. Still,
all or nearly all municipalities are experiencing an increase in the level of unfunded
liability in their police and fire pension
funds, and all will ultimately be hurt if the
present rate of increases continues.
Even now, the high cost of police and fire
pensions is causing adjustments in municipal service levels and may be curtailing
the expansion of police and fire personnel

on the streets. Some communities have
stopped adding new police officers because
required pension payments make new positions too expensive.
A case in point is the City of Rock Island.
The City recently reported to its residents
that it “has doubled its contribution (to its
police and fire pension funds) over the past
ten years, that its employees have made
their required contributions to these funds,
and that the investment returns on its pension funds have been good.”7 Yet, despite
these funding efforts, the City’s unfunded
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The Rock Island Experience

City contributions to its police and fire pension funds have increased 103% in the
past ten years.
City contributions to police and fire pension funds now total more than $20,000
per firefighter per year and more than $15,000 per police officer per year. This
compares to an annual contribution of approximately $3,500 per employee per year
for all other city employees.
City contributions to its police and fire pension funds have increased as a per cent of
payroll by 31%, from 26% of payroll to 34% of payroll in just the last ten years.
The portion of the total city property tax levy used just to fund police and fire
pensions has increased 75% in the last ten years, going from 16% of total property
tax revenues in 1997 to 28% of property tax revenues in 2007.
The percentage of Rock Island property taxes going to pay police and fire pensions
will continue to increase in the years ahead since the aggregate unfunded liability
in the two funds has increased by more than 150% in the past ten years.

pension liability has increased 150 per cent
over those same years. See Table 1.		
The report also notes that the unfunded
liability in its police and fire pension
funds “now equals $283,590 per active
(police and fire) employee and more than
$1,000 per capita for our citizens.”8 The
City’s report led its local newspaper, The
Rock Island Argus, to label the city’s police and fire pension funds system “badly
broken.”9
Small communities, too, face these problems. Bellwood’s police pension fund,
for example, experienced an increase of
1100% in its unfunded liability in just
seventeen years, between 1987 and 2004.

During this same period, its police pension fund tax levy, calculated as a percent
of payroll, nearly doubled, growing from
19.68% in 1987 to 36.90% in 2004.10
What is causing the increase in
unfunded pension liabilities?
While there is general agreement that the
level of unfunded pension liabilities is increasing, there is less agreement about the
causes and seriousness of the problem.
Many causes can be, and have been, cited.
One, of course, is the increasing life expectancy of the population which, when
combined with the cultural tendency in
the United States for people to retire at

7

an earlier age, means that pension funds
are being required to support retirees for
a longer period of time.
The funds can be negatively affected by
factors which can not be known for sure.
Pension funds are invested in bonds and
other assets to increase fund values, but
due to concerns over potential losses of
asset value, pension funds are limited by
law in their ability to invest in stock funds
and other equities. Investment returns vary
year by year with economic conditions,
and periods of economic downturn, such
as the downturn in the late 1970’s and
early 1980’s and in the period of 2000 to
2003, result in lower investment returns
and higher levels of unfunded liabilities.
In the period covered by the IML report
(e.g. 1987-2004), however, investment
returns were, on average, much higher
than historical norms so that should have
reduced their level of fund liabilities. The
fact that the police and fire pension fund
liabilities increased during this period
simply indicates that the funding problems
in those funds are even worse than the data
would indicate.11
Different groups affected by local government pension systems have different ideas
about the causes of the problem. The views
of three such groups are set forth below.
Local government officials place the primary blame on continued benefit enhancements mandated by the state legislature
which, in turn, has not made provision
for new funds to pay the costs of the new
benefits.

8
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Indeed, this is a problem which has plagued
many government pension programs: Examples include Congress’ failue to provide
adequate new revenues when it expanded
the benefits paid out by the nation’s social
security system (e.g. Medicare); and it
has been state mandated benefits which,
because the General Assembly increased
benefits without new funding, now imperil
the pension systems for Illinois teachers
and state employees.
Local officials argue that improved benefits, while desirable in and of themselves,
are not needed to entice more recruits to
their police and fire forces. Throughout
the state, the supply of recruits has been
more than adequate to meet local government needs.
Thus it is not surprising that many local
government officials want the Illinois General Assembly to refrain from legislating
further benefit enhancements until the pension funds reach the 90% funded level.
Police and fire unions acknowledge their
funds’ fiscal plight, but place the blame
squarely on the failure of municipalities
to make adequate contributions to sustain
the funds. They argue that municipalities
select actuaries who will use assumptions
that minimize required municipal contributions. They “are not unsympathetic to the
burden passed on to taxpayers for properly
funding the municipal pension programs,”
but assert that “managing a municipality is
a difficult task requiring tradeoffs within
the budget.”12

The unions continue to petition the Illinois
General Assembly for additional benefit
enhancements, most recently a proposal
entitled “Deferred Retirement Option
Program” or DROP. The proposal would
permit Illinois police officers and fire
fighters to retire on full pension after thirty
years of service and then continue to work
an additional five years while simultaneously collecting their pension benefits.
After five years of such post-retirement
service, the retirees would then collect a
lump sum benefit comprised of the funds
contributed to the pension fund on their
behalf during their five year extension.
The unions further argue that this benefit
enhancement will not lead to any increase
in pension costs.13 An independent study of
the DROP proposal by the Illinois Government Finance Officers Association found
that it would increase unfunded liabilities
in the police and fire pension funds of 23
municipalities by an aggregate amount
greater than $40 million.14
The Civic Federation, a widely respected,
independent commentator on state and
local tax and fiscal policies in Illinois,
has expressed grave concern about the
structure of pension board governance in
Illinois, arguing that most pension boards,
including local police and fire pension
boards, are poorly organized, with a majority or more of their members made up of
active employees or retirees serviced by
the funds they control. There are many
groups besides union members that have
a fiduciary stake in the performance of
the pension boards, not the least of which
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are local taxpayers. The Civic Federation
argues,
The mission of a public pension
fund board of trustees should be to
safeguard the fund’s assets through
prudent investments and effective
management. Unfortunately, some
local pension boards also act as advocates on behalf of fund members,
lobbying for benefit enhancements
that ultimately increase the fund’s
liabilities.15
The problem described by the Civic Federation was directed at the Chicago police
and fire pension fund governance, but it is
equally applicable elsewhere in the state.
What is the primary cause of the fiscal
plight of police and fire pension funds?
Most of the problems listed above contribute to the financial plight of outstate municipal police and fire pension funds, but
the problem is caused by poorly designed
pension systems.
Like other public employee pension funds,
outstate municipal police and fire pension
funds are of a defined benefit nature. That
means that the benefits to be paid from
the funds are set forth in state statutes.
Furthermore, those same statutes also
require municipal officials to levy whatever property taxes are needed to meet
that community’s statutory pension fund
contributions for that year.

Center for Governmental Studies
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What this means is that, while it is the Illinois General Assembly that determines
the pension fund benefits that must be paid,
it is the local governments – local elected
officials – who must levy the taxes to pay
them. From a public policy perspective, it
is the members of the state legislature who
get all the political rewards from raising
pension and survivor benefit levels and it
is the members of city and village councils
and boards who pay the political price for
raising the taxes to pay for the benefits.
The results of this flawed system can be
seen in the negative impact of the most
recent benefit enhancements mandated in
2000 (fire), 2001 (police), and 2005 (fire)
by the Illinois General Assembly to the
unfunded liabilities of outstate police and
fire pension funds. The mandated benefit
enhancements, without provision for new
funds to underwrite the added liabilities,
created new strains on the affected pension
funds. The sharp increases in the outstate
police and fire pension funds’ unfunded
liabilities reported in charts 2 and 3 plus
the sharp drop in the funds’ funded ratios
reported in charts 4 and 5 attest to the
impact of these benefit increases.
The ultimate indignity is faced by municipal officials in those communities limited
by tax caps. The Illinois General Assembly
passes outstate police-fire pension benefit
enhancements and, in so doing, requires
local property tax increases to pay for
the cost of the benefits. But it is the same

policyprofiles
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General Assembly which, by establishing
the tax caps, limited the taxes that can be
imposed to meet the unfunded liability.

therefore further benefit increases should
be postponed until existing benefits are
made more secure by better funding.

What should be done to improve the
funds’ financial health?

The representatives of police and fire
unions have stated that the recently proposed benefit enhancements will not add
to pension fund costs. State lawmakers
should be smart enough to realize that
any benefit increase, by simple definition,
costs money and increased costs require
increased funding which, for now, means
increased taxes. Any benefit change that
permits earlier retirement, for instance,
absolutely must lead to an increase in fund
liabilities and in tax levies to support the
enhancement.

Ultimately, Illinois Gover nor Rod
Blagojevich put the matter most succinctly
in his 2005 annual budget address to the
General Assembly when he argued,
Unless we reform the way we fund
our pensions....we will never eliminate the structural deficit that takes
money away from education, from
health care, from law enforcement,
from parks, and from everything else
we care about.
The formulation of a comprehensive plan
to reduce the outstate pension funds’ unfunded liabilities is beyond the scope of
this paper, but any solution must be predicated on changes made by state lawmakers,
local government officials, and police and
fire unions.
State lawmakers First, and foremost, the
Illinois General Assembly must do no additional harm. No further benefit enhancements should be considered for municipal
police and fire pension funds until the
legislature has taken meaningful action
to make the funds more fiscally sound.
By any measurement, current benefit levels are competitive with other states, and

Illinois state legislators must understand
and be held accountable for any vote for
increased police and fire pension benefits
because any such vote is a vote to increase
the property taxes of their constituents.
In the long run, the Civic Federation got it
right: “governments (must) stop granting
any new retirement benefit enhancements
unless they also increase employer and/
or employee contributions sufficiently to
fully fund the enhancements.”16 (Emphasis
in the original)
Local Government Officials These officials are right to resist and seek to minimize local tax increases. They are faced
with the most difficult task in government:
deciding how to use their governments’
limited f iscal resources to maximum
advantage while limiting the tax burden

10
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on their constituents. At the same time,
however, they must make sincere efforts
to find the money to reduce the unfunded
liabilities in employee pension funds. They
must also work with their employees and
with state legislators to make them understand that all increases in constituent
services and employee benefits have cost
implications.
The Unions Union leaders must understand that the management of local pension
boards will be enhanced by the achievement of a better balance between selfinterested employees and highly qualified
professionals from the fields of investment
and actuarial science. Such boards will
have greater credibility with city councils,
village boards, and state legislators.
Unions would also be well advised to
avoid the kinds of “double-speak” which
has characterized their support of the
DROP proposal. Quite apart from the hard
evidence cited earlier (see endnote 12),
the unions’ argument that DROP would
not increase costs – based on the lack of
hard evidence that it would lead to earlier
retirements – is specious at best; the unions
would not advance and fight for the proposal unless it was attractive to their membership (meaning that they expected many
of their members would take advantage of
the added benefits). Benefits that go unused
are not benefits at all. Argumentation at this
level does nothing to enhance the integrity
of their organizations.

Whose job is it, ultimately, to protect
the integrity of the pension funds?
Ultimately, it is the job of state legislators. Because they determine the benefit
levels, the funding formulae, and the local
authority to impose taxes, it is ultimately
their responsibility to see that the pension systems are both financially sound
and meeting the needs of the state’s well
deserving police officers and fire fighters.
When either objective is not being met, it
is the legislature’s duty – from both legal
and humanitarian considerations – to correct the situation.
In short, it is the Illinois General Assembly
that is failing in its responsibility to provide
sufficient security for the pension needs of
outstate police officers and fire fighters.
Like medical doctors who have taken an
oath to “first do no harm,” the General Assembly must tackle the police/fire pension
problem by first doing no harm.
Illinois legislators must stop making the
outstate police/fire pension plans worse by
adding new benefits before funds are available to cover the unfunded liabilities exacerbated by past benefit enhancements.
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Endnotes
1. As used in this report, the word “outstate” will refer to all cities and villages in Illinois except Chicago. Thus, what is said in this report refers to
all suburban as well as all downstate police officers and firefighters as well as police and fire pension funds.
2. Illinois Municipal League, Fiscal Analysis of the Downstate Police, Fire, and IMRF Pension Systems (Springfield, IL: The League, February
2007). The acronym IMRF refers to the Illinois Municipal Employees Retirement Fund.
3. The body of this report focuses on all Illinois municipal police and fire pension funds except Chicago, but most of what is said herein applies
with equal validity to the Chicago police and fire pension funds. Indeed, of the 17 major public pension funds or aggregates of similar types of pension funds, the Chicago police and fire pension funds rank number three and four, respectively, in terms of their per capita unfunded liability among
active employees (see Chart 1 in the publication cited in footnote #2).
4. Analyzed in the IML study were the police and fire pension funds in the following municipalities: Barrington, Bellwood, Bolingbrook, Carbondale, Chicago Ridge, Edwardsville, Elk Grove Village, Forest Park, Hoffman Estates, Homewood, Lombard, Midlothian, Mt. Prospect, Naperville,
Oak Brook, Oak Forest, Peoria, Rock Island, Rockford, Roselle, Schaumburg, Skokie, Springfield, Wilmette, and Winnetka. Also analyzed were the
fire pension funds in the following municipalities: Lake in the Hills, Lisle, McHenry, New Lenox, North Lake, Riverside, Westmont, Wood Dale, and
Woodstock.
5. The levy information in the table is based on the Illinois Department of Financial and Professional Regulation’s suggested tax levies.
6. E-mail from Champaign City Manager Steve Carter to the authors dated September 7, 2007.
7. City Manager’s Budget Message, City of Rock Island, February 2006, p. 40.
8. Ibid., p. 40.
9. “Editorials: Another disaster lurking,” The Rock Island Argus, April 8, 2007, p. A6.
10. Fiscal Analysis of the Downstate Police, Fire, and IMRF Pension System, p. 39.
11. Determining the level of funding needed to assure that future pension obligations can be met requires assumptions about future conditions. These
assumptions are made by professionals called “actuaries.” In managing their pension funds, municipalities can hire their own actuaries, but all must
be fully certified in their profession. To control for this factor, all figures contained in the IML report were based on the actuarial assumptions set
forth by the Illinois Department of Professional and Financial Regulation.
12. Undated paper prepared by the Illinois Public Pension Fund Association commenting on the IML report and titled, simply, “Introduction,” p. 9.
13. Pension Trustee Newsletter, Illinois Public Pension Fund Association, July 2006, pp. 1 and 9.
14. “Why IGFOA Frowns on DROP as Proposed,” Illinois Public Pensions, Illinois Government Finance Officers Association: Spring, 2006, p. 2.
The article can be found on the internet at http://www.igfoa.org/newletters/Pen_spring06.pdf.
15. The Civic Federation, Status of Local Pension Funding, Fiscal Year 2004: An Evaluation of Ten Local Government Employee Pension Funds in
Cook County, February 27, 2006, p. 30.
16. The Civic Federation (see report described in note # 12) p. 29.
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